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LACK OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND
ITS IMPACT ON TRANSNATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION
Omar E. Garcia-Bolivar*
I. INTRODUCTIONIN today's world, as the economies of every country are dependent on
each other, so are their judicial systems. What is decided, or not, by
courts of one country more frequently is bound to have an impact
beyond the countries' borders.
By the same token, the notion of due process of law has become a
global concept, one that is essential for the world's peace and sus-
tainability. Intertwined with the concept of due process, the indepen-
dence of the judicial system has emerged as a concept with its own
strength. It is simply not feasible to guarantee due process, rule of law,
and democracy without minimum judicial guarantees, which include inde-
pendence from factors external to the case or anyone to solve disputes.
Of course, the existence of a system of judicial independence is rele-
vant for public policy purposes. It would be in the interest of the citizens
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of a country and the policy makers that justice is adjudicated in a fair and
independent manner. In that vein, other countries might have interest in
the development of strong and reliable institutions elsewhere as that
would guarantee stability and order in the world. But, the purpose of this
article is not to discuss the relevance of judicial independence in the con-
text of those very important areas, but rather in the context of the more
trivial arena of transnational and international litigation. Thus, although
one would be tempted to introduce suggestions to foster the indepen-
dence of the judiciaries, that is not the purpose here.
In most cases, whether a national judiciary has transnational or interna-
tional consequences is conditioned on the existence of judicial indepen-
dence. How, what, and who measures the independence of a judicial
system is a sensitive topic that touches the very thread of the concept of
sovereignty. Thus, measuring the independence of a judicial system is a
very delicate matter upon which the subjectivity should not have re-
course. Unfortunately, there is no objective and uniform method to de-
termine the independence of a judiciary.
Be that as it may, the judicial independence of countries is regularly
tested in foreign fora. The purpose of this article is not to discuss the
good or bad of the foreign or international review of a country's judicial
system. That is a matter for a different analysis. Rather, because the
independence of judicial systems can be scrutinized by foreign or interna-
tional tribunals, the purpose here is, on one hand, to expose the notion of
judicial independence and its implications abroad, while on the other
hand, to provide interested parties with the most objective tools used by
expert witnesses to determine when a judicial system can be considered
independent or not. Those tools might be useful to determine with unbi-
ased grounds when a judicial system is independent. In doing that, the
party arguing the lack of independence as well as the party defending its
own judicial system might benefit. Thus, by highlighting the hypotheses
under which the judicial independence can be an issue and proposing a
methodology to measure it, this article would have fulfilled its purpose.
II. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE DEFINED
Judicial independence is a sine qua non requisite of the rule of law.1
Judges are meant to be independent, impartial, and insulated from influ-
ence outside of the merits of the case. 2 In an independent judicial system
judges are accountable for their actions but are not subject to political or
economical factors in deciding the cases before them.
By being independent, judges foster the rule of law, i.e., they make the
law superior and binding to everyone without distinction. But for judicial
1. See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, Judicial independence and corruption, in TRANS-
PARENCY INT'L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT: CORRUFFION IN JUDICIAL SYS-
TEMs 15 (Diana Rodriguez & Linda Ehrichs eds., 2007), available at http://
www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/gcr_2007.
2. Id. at 16.
LACK OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
independence to exist, the law needs to guarantee this principle and
judges need to be serious and respected professionals who are granted
stability and are freed from political or economic influences with respect
to their decisions.3
Judicial independence as part of the international concept of due pro-
cess embodies "a concept of fair procedure simple and basic enough to
describe the judicial process of civilized nations, our peers."4
Domestic judicial systems can be subject to international scrutiny for
different reasons.5 One manifestation of denial of justice is lack of judi-
cial independence, which also comprises judicial corruption. 6 In many
cases, the judgment or judicial action against which there is a complaint
might not be per se tainted by corruption or it might be difficult to prove.7
But when the judicial action is the result of a judicial system widely con-
sidered to not be independent, it might expose the judicial system to in-
ternational or foreign review.8
Lack of independence is usually affected by corruption either in the
form of political influence or economic bribery.9
Independence implies that judges' careers do not depend on pleasing
those with political and economic power. Such separation of powers
is necessary both to prevent politicians from interfering with judicial
decision-making and to stop incumbent politicians from targeting
their political opponents by using the power of civil and criminal
courts as a way of sidelining potential challengers. The judiciary
needs to be able to distinguish strong, legitimate cases from those
that are weak or politically motivated. Otherwise, the public and
users of the court system will lose confidence in the credibility and
reliability of the court system to punish and pass judgment on crimes
and civil disputes, and judicial sanctions will have little deterrent ef-
fect. Individuals may conclude that the likelihood of arrest and con-
viction is random or, even worse, tied to one's political predilections.
In such cases, the legal process does not deter corruption and it may
undermine the competitiveness of democratic politics.' 0
Some states might have reasons to criticize some parts of the system of
international law on suspicion or appearance of bias or imbalance, as
some might argue is the case with the international protection of foreign
investment." As a consequence, review of its judicial systems might not
be acceptable to them.12 In many cases, the review can be offensive and
3. Id.
4. Society of Lloyds v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000).
5. See Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act § 4(a)(1), 13 U.L.A. 263
(1986).
6. See Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1347-48 (2009).
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 16.
10. Id.
11. See Loewen Group v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, NAFTA
award on merits, $ 49, (June 26, 2003).
12. See id.
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perceived contrary to the sovereignty.13 In other cases, the review might
not reflect more than just a consequence of the internationalization of the
law, where the judicial system is not judged; rather some of the judicial
system's outputs or omissions-those with a foreign impact-are recog-
nized or are the source of some kind of international remedy. 14
III. IMPACT OF LACK OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
There are different situations under which a judicial system is analyzed
for purposes of international litigation.' 5
A. ENFORCEMENT OF A FOREIGN JUDGMENT
Judicial systems may be analyzed when a judgment is issued by the
courts of one country but is to be enforced in another country.16 Coun-
tries.are not compelled to enforce foreign judgments but do so as a mat-
ter of comity, which "[r]ests on the principle of reciprocity which is
generally the basis for relations among sovereign nations.'"7 Put another
way, "[n]ations are not inexorably bound to enforce judgments obtained
in each other's courts. However, [many] courts will enforce foreign judg-
ments that arise out of proceedings which comport with basic principles
of due process."' 8 Similarly, "[e]very nation must be the final judge for
itself, not only of the nature and extent of the duty but of the occasions
on which its exercise may be justly demanded."' 9
Thus, before a U.S. court can grant recognition of a foreign country
judgment, it must "satisfy itself of the essential fairness of the judicial
system under which the judgment was rendered." 20 It should be noted,
however, that states within the United States that have adopted the Uni-
form Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act shall not recognize a
foreign judgment rendered under a system that does not provide impar-
tial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due pro-
cess of law. 21
Consequently, although countries tend to enforce judgments of foreign
courts under certain conditions, a country's lack of judicial independence
may stand in the way. Occasionally, a judicial system's lack of indepen-
13. See id.
14. See id. at 138.
15. See Society of Lloyds, 233 F.3d at 477.
16. Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act § 1(2), 13 U.L.A. 263 (1986).
17. John S. Baker Jr. & Agustin Parise, Conflicts in International Tort Litigation Be-
tween U.S. and Latin American Courts, 42 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 1, 24
(2010).
18. Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1413 (9th Cir. 1995).
19. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895) (quoting Justice Story, Conflict of Laws,
§§ 33-38).
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAw § 482 cmt. b (1987); see also
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 671 (1892) (a court presented with a foreign
judgment must "ascertain whether the claim is really one of such a nature that the
court is authorized to enforce it.").
21. Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act § 4(a)(1).
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dence may prevent the judgment from being enforced by another coun-
try's judicial system.22  Hence, the determination of judicial
independence of the juridical system of a country can be essential to
whether an obstacle can be overcome in making effective the outcome of
foreign courts.2 3
In Hilton v. Guyot, the criterion for purposes of enforcing foreign judg-
ments was set forth.2 4 It was stated:
[Wlhere there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad
before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon
regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of
the defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure
an impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own
country and those of other countries, and there is nothing to show
either prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under which it
was sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special
reason why the comity of this nation should not allow it full effect,
the merits of the case should not, in an action brought in this country
upon the judgment, be tried afresh ... 25
Other cases have followed. 2 6 The Second Circuit in Bridgeway Corp. v
Citibank27 affirmed the district court's finding that Liberia lacked a sys-
tem of impartial tribunals and thus lacked the grounds to have its judg-
ment enforced. The evidence in Bridgeway was that Liberia's courts in
practice did not operate independently, specifically "[t]he Liberian Con-
stitution was ignored" and "corruption and incompetent handling of cases
were prevalent." 28
In Osorio v. Dole Food Co., the U.S. District Court of the Southern
District of Florida expressly said that the Nicaraguan judicial system as a
whole was not independent, and thus refused enforcement of its judg-
ment, stating: "[W]hile on paper and in theory Nicaragua has all the trap-
pings of an independent judiciary, in practice the judiciary does not act
impartially." 2 9 The Court also ruled,
[There is] persuasive evidence that direct political interference and
judicial corruption in Nicaragua is widespread. . . . [Nicaragua has] a
system in which political strongmen exert their control over a weak
and corrupt judiciary . . . which does not provide impartial tribunal
or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of
law. 30




26. See, e.g., Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 137 (2d Cir. 2000).
27. Id.
28. Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 45 F. Supp. 2d 276, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd, 201
F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2000).
29. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1347-48.
30. Id. at 1351-52.
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As a corollary to measure the independence of a country's system of
administration of justice for purposes of enforcing a foreign judgment in
the United States the following tests should be undertaken:31
* Whether it is a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial
administration of justice;
* Whether there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial;
* Whether there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court, or in
the system of laws; and
* Whether there has not been denial of justice in civil, or proceedings
in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the
principal legal systems of the world.
The analysis for lack of independence is a systemic one. 3 2 Thus, the
first test refers to the general aspects of the judiciary without any refer-
ence to a specific case. 33 The other three refer to the impact of the judici-
ary to a specific case.34
B. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a jurisdiction can refuse
to hear a case because its courts are not convenient to handle the case.
Many issues are considered to determine this, one of which pertains to
the "appropriateness" criterion under which the judicial independence is
taken into account.
Generally, under this doctrine, a defendant might argue that the courts
of a given country are not the appropriate forum to deal with certain
cases as there are courts in other countries that are better suited to man-
age those particular cases.35 The plaintiff can reply by arguing that the
courts allegedly better suited lack judicial independence. If the argument
of the defendant succeeds, a suit can be removed from a court as the
forum of the plaintiff is adequate to handle the litigation. But if the
plaintiff has counter argued that the courts of the country hearing the
case lack judicial independence, the issue will be whether that country
has a system of independent and impartial tribunals.36 In that context,
evidence of the independence of the judicial system or lack thereof would
be needed.37 The issue is how to objectively determine whether a system
of justice is independent.38
In Schwarzinger v. Bramwell, a British Columbia court concluded that
it was an adequate forum to hear a claim against Canadian defendants




35. Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Coveniens
and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1446 (2011).
36. Id.
37. See Schwarzinger v. Bramwell, No. S100583, 2011 CarswellBC 512, $$ 111-12
(B.C.S.C. July 28, 2011) (WL) (Can.).
38. See id. $ 59.
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based on intended purchase of property in Nicaragua.39 The court de-
cided that based on evidence of lack of judicial independence, Nicaragua
was not the appropriate forum for the action.40 "[T]he plaintiffs have
raised a serious concern about whether the case would be decided on the
merits in the Nicaraguan judicial system, which is a factor suggesting Brit-
ish Columbia is the appropriate forum." 41
But, in the United States, the criteria on lack of judicial independence
for purposes of forum non conveniens has been more lax. 4 2 In Banco
Latino v. Gomez Lopez, it was said that "the burden of establishing
whether an alternative forum exists is not a heavy one." 4 3 Similarly, "[a]n
adequate forum need not be a perfect forum." 44
Thus, the criteria in the United States for refusing to enforce a judg-
ment in connection with the lack of judicial independence is different
from the ones used for considering a forum adequate or not to hear a
claim.45 "Only evidence of actual corruption in a particular case will war-
rant a finding that an alternate forum is inadequate." 46 Conversely, the
conclusion that a judicial system is not impartial and thus its output
should not be recognized and enforced in the United States is "[a] gener-
alization, and like all generalizations it is subject to exceptions." 47
C. INSURANCE POLICY CLAIM
An insurance policy might have been issued to protect against non-
commercial risks in a foreign country, such as indirect expropriations. 48
For example, a judicial order from a judicial system perceived as non-
independent and which grants title to valuable goods in violation of mini-
mum international principles of due process of law, i.e., disregarding legal
arguments of one of the parties, lack of availability of court documents to
one of the parties, and gross abbreviation of document filing times for
one of the parties, all in violation of domestic procedural rules, might be
considered a theft for purposes of insurance claims.49
In these cases, when the risk materializes in the form of a judgment
that deprives a person of her assets, a thorough analysis of the judicial
system of the given country is required to determine if the outcome upon
which the insurance will apply is the result of a system of independent
39. Id. 11 111-12.
40. Id. 1 106.
41. Id. 1 110.
42. See e.g., Banco Latino v. Gomez Lopez, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1331 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
43. Id. (citing Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Oy Wartsila Ab, 159 B.R. 984, 990 (S.D.
Fla. 1993)).
44. Satz v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 244 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 1979).
45. See, e.g., Warter v. Boston Sec., S.A., 380 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
46. Id. at 1311.
47. See Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1349 n.16.
48. See Society of Lloyds, 233 F.3d at 475 (overseer of insurance syndicate attempting
to enforce foreign judgment in Illinois).
49. The author is aware of a case that was presented under these circumstances, but
was eventually settled.
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justice or not.50 Additionally, in some cases not necessarily related to
non-commercial risk, the insurance policy can require as a precondition
that local judicial remedies are exhausted. When those judicial remedies
are available in a system that lacks judicial independence, an argument
can be made that it would be futile to litigate in local courts and conse-
quently consider that the precondition has been satisfied.51 But, the issue
in these assumptions is how to objectively determine the judicial indepen-
dence or lack thereof of a juridical system of a given country.
D. DENIAL OF JUSTICE UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
An investor entitled to international protection against the deeds of the
host state under international investment agreements may claim that
there has been a violation to the obligation of fair and equitable treat-
ment when she has been required to litigate in a local judicial system that
lacks independence.52
Some international investment agreements expressly include an obliga-
tion by the states not to deny justice to foreign investors and provide that
where that occurs it would be considered a violation to the obligation to
provide fair and equitable treatment.53 For example, the U.S. DR-
CAFTA Article 10.5 (1) provides that "[e]ach Party shall accord to cov-
ered investments treatment in accordance with customary international
law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and secur-
ity." 54 Subsequently, Article 10.5(2)(a) provides: "'fair and equitable
treatment' includes the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or
administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle
of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world."55
The standard to determine the existence of denial of justice in interna-
50. See Society of Lloyds, 233 F.3d at 477.
51. Christina Weston, The Enforcement Loophole: Judgment-Recognition Defenses as
a Loophole to Corporate Accountability for Conduct Abroad, 25 EMORY INT'L L.
REV. 731, 743 (2011) (recognizing that lack of due process and impartiality can be
raised as defenses in various judgments).
52. See Loewen Group, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, NAFTA award on merits, 9
64, (June 26, 2003).
53. Id.
54. Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, art.
10.5(1), August 5, 2004, 43 I.L.M 514 (draft text), available at http://ustr.gov/frade
Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DRFinalTexts/Sectionlndex.html. See
also United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement art 10.4, U.S.-Chile, July 6, 2003,
117 Stat. 909, available at http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral!
ChileFIA/SectionIndex.html.; United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agree-
ment art 10.5, U.S.-Colom., May 8, 2006 (draft), available at http://www.ustr.gov/
TradeAgreements/Bilateral/Colombia_FTA/DraftText/SectionIndex.html;
United States-Peru Free Trade Agreement art 10.5, U.S.-Peru, Dec. 7,2005, availa-
ble athttp://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/PeruPA/DraftTexts/Sec-
tionIndex.html; United States-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement art 10.5,
U.S.-Pan., June 28, 2007, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-
trade-agreements/panama-tpa/final-text, (Providing the same guarantee and in-
cluding the obligation not to deny justice under the definition of "fair and equita-
ble treatment").
55. Id. art. 10.5(2)(a).
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tional law is a systemic one. 56 "[T]he awards and texts make clear that
error on the part of the national court is not enough, what is required is
'manifest injustice' or 'gross unfairness"57 or "palpable violation" in
which "bad faith not judicial error seems to be the heart of the matter."58
The arbitral tribunals that have looked into this issue have pointed out,
"[a] denial of justice could be pleaded if the relevant courts refuse to
entertain a suit, if they subject it to undue delay, or if they administer
justice in a seriously inadequate way."59 In another case, the arbitrators
said that "[t]he question is whether, at an international level and having
regard to generally accepted standards of the administration of justice, a
tribunal can conclude in the light of all the available facts that the im-
pugned decision was clearly improper and discreditable ... . "60 Similarly,
a subsequent arbitral tribunal pointed out that "[m]anifest injustice in the
sense of a lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends a
sense of judicial propriety is enough, even if one applies the Interpreta-
tion according to its terms." 6' In the context of denial of justice, the arbi-
tral tribunals have stressed that different factors are to be considered, one
of which could involve the court system.62 "As with denial of justice
under customary international law, some of the factors that may be con-
sidered are the complexity of the case, the behavior of the litigants in-
volved, the significance of the interests at stake in the case, and the
behavior of the courts themselves." 63
Other international investment agreements provide that states "shall
provide effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights with re-
spect to investment, investment agreements, and investment authoriza-
tions." 64 Whereby the term "effective" could be interpreted as a system
56. J.W. Garner, International Responsibility of States for Judgments of Courts and
Verdicts of Juries Amounting to Denial of Justice, 10 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 181, 183




58. D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAi LAw 498, (2d ed. 1970).
59. Azinian v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/2, NAFTA, 1 102 (Nov. 1,
1999).
60. Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, NAFTA, 9
127, (Oct. 11, 2002).
61. See Loewen Group, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 132.
62. See Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 34877 (U.S. v. Ecuador), Partial
Award on the Merits, T 250 (Mar. 30, 2010), available at http://italaw.com/docu-
ments/ChevronEcuadorFinalAward.pdf.
63. Id.
64. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador Con-
cerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment art. 11(7),
U.S.-Ecuador, Aug. 27, 1993, T.I.A.S; The Energy Charter Treaty art.10 (12), Dec.
17, 1991, 2080 U.N.T.S. 100. "Each Contracting Party shall ensure that its domes-
tic law provides effective means for the assertion of claims and the enforcement of
rights with respect to Investments, investment agreements, and investment autho-
rizations." See also, The Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Oriental Republic of Uruguay Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment art.5(2)(a), U.S.-Uru., Nov. 4, 2005, T.I.A.S. "'Fair and
equitable treatment' includes the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or
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of judiciary able to successfully provide the intended result, i.e. justice in
an independent manner.65 In other words, "[effective means]" "guaran-
tees the access to the courts and the existence of institutional mechanisms
for the protection of investments." 6 6
The lack of judicial independence for reasons such as corruption or
political interference might create conditions for monetary reparation. In
those cases the investor might ask for compensation due to the grievances
caused by the outcome of domestic courts. The argument of denial of
justice might be linked to this hypothesis as a foreigner could argue that
exposure to a system of justice that lack of independence has been tanta-
mount to not having access to justice at all. By the same vein, in the
context of international investment protection an investor may be enti-
tled to compensation for indirect expropriations, some of which might be
considered realized when the property is taken through judgments that
are the product of courts that lack independence.
In some cases, investors need to exhaust local remedies before having
access to the international dispute resolution mechanisms available. But,
the argument of futility can successfully be made when those remedies
need to be exhausted in a system where there is no judicial independence.
In this case, as in the others, the objective determination of the judicial
independence or lack thereof is crucial.
The former President of the International Court of Justice, Judge
Jim6nez de Ardchaga, believed that it was an essential condition of a
state being held responsible for a judicial decision in breach of municipal
law that the decision must be a decision of a court of last resort, all reme-
dies having been exhausted. 67
[I]n the present century State responsibility for judicial acts came to
be recognized. Although independent of Government, the judiciary
is not independent of the State: the judgment given by a judicial
authority emanates from an organ of the State in just the same way
as a law promulgated by the legislature or a decision taken by the
executive.68
Accordingly, before resorting to international fora, the general rule is
to first reach the highest level of the local judiciary.
Although it has been said that the responsibility of the State for a
breach of international law constituted by an alleged judicial action
arises only when there is final action by the State's judicial system
administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due
process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world." Significantly, the
principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world re-
quires that justice be imparted in an independent manner.
65. See OxFoRo DICTIONARY defining "effective" as: "successful in producing a de-
sired or intended result."
66. Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil S.A. v. Republic Of Ecuador, IC-
SID Case No. ARB/04/19, Award, [ 391 (Aug. 18, 2008).
67. EDUARDO JIMItNEZ DE ARIPCHAGA, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE PASr THIRD OF
A CENTURY 282 (1978).
68. Id.
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considered as a whole, it is now recognised that the judiciary is an
organ of the State and that judicial action which violates a rule of
international law is attributable to the State (A.V. Freeman, The In-
ternational Responsibility of States for Denial of Justice, 31-33
(1970)). The rule of judicial finality was influenced by the principles
of separation, independence of the judiciary and respect for the final-
ity of judicial decisions. However, the judiciary, though independent
of Government, is not independent of the State and the judgment of
a court proceeds from an organ of the State as does a decision of the
executive. 69
In some cases, it might not be possible to exhaust the local remedies
under a judicial system.
Certain principles of customary international law, such as the princi-
ple of "judicial finality" requiring complete exhaustion of local reme-
dies in order to establish State Responsibility for the acts of a State's
judiciary, are not applicable in the same way under this lex specialist.
In particular, as further discussed below, specific considerations be-
come relevant to examine whether and how the non-exhaustion of
local remedies can be raised and applied in cases where the delay of
the domestic courts in deciding a case is the breach, because it is the
domestic courts themselves that cause the non-exhaustion of the lo-
cal remedies.70
Lack of judicial independence is also relevant in the context of state
responsibility for injury to aliens caused by denial of justice. Not only can
an alien himself bring an action against an alleged perpetrator state if the
relevant treaties are in place, but the alien's native state may also bring
an action against the alleged perpetrator state. For example, in the ELSI
case between the United States and Italy, a Chamber of the International
Court of Justice described arbitrary conduct as that which displays "a
willful disregard of due process of law, . . . which shocks, or at least sur-
prises, a sense of judicial propriety."7'
Previously, Judge Tanaka of the International Court of Justice, in a sep-
arate opinion in the Barcelona Traction72 case between the Kingdom of
Belgium and the Kingdom of Spain, expressed circumstances that give
rise to a claim of denial of justice, including lack of independence.
[Ilt remains to examine whether behind the alleged errors and irreg-
ularities of the Spanish judiciary some grave circumstances do not
exist which may justify the charge of a denial of justice. Conspicuous
examples thereof would be 'corruption, threats, unwarrantable de-
lay, flagrant abuse of judicial procedure, a judgment dictated by the
executive, or so manifestly unjust that no court which was both com-
petent and honest could have given it' . . . We may sum up these
69. Loewen Group v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, NAFTA Deci-
sion on Jurisdiction, $ 69 (Jan. 5, 2001).
70. Chevron Corp., PCA Case No. 34877, T 321.
71. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, 76, T 128 (July 20).
72. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 160, $ 158
(Feb. 3) (separate opinion of Judge Tanaka).
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circumstances under the single head of 'bad faith'."73
In sum, countries have an obligation to provide "fundamental fairness
in the administration of justice," 74 which is breached when proceedings
are so faulty as to exclude all reasonable expectations of a fair decision.75
States have a duty to create and maintain a system of justice that protects
against or corrects unfairness to foreigners.76 A system likely to secure
an impartial administration of justice furthers due process of law. Flawed
and biased procedures, as well as litigation delay and refusal to judge,
deny due process to individuals. But more prominently, lack of impartial-
ity by the judges is the quintessential denial of due process of law. Judges
that are not independent are not impartial and consequently cannot se-
cure an impartial administration of justice.
E. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
A victim of human rights violations in her country of origin might have
individual access to international tribunals to obtain justice. Alleged vio-
lations of human rights may involve protected rights or denial of justice.
If it is the latter, introducing evidence that the local courts lack indepen-
dence is required. Even when the violation of other rights is alleged, it is
usually still necessary to exhaust local legal remedies before accessing the
international tribunals. There is, however, an exception to the exhaustion
of local remedies requirement when the local remedies are available in a
system that lacks judicial independence.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has examined these issues
extensively. It has said that:
[T]he right to be tried by an impartial judge or court is a fundamen-
tal guarantee of due process. In other words, the person on trial
must have the guarantee that the judge or court presiding over his
case brings to it the utmost objectivity. This way, courts inspire the
necessary trust and confidence in the parties to the case and in the
citizens of a democratic society.77
Similarly, the Court has stressed the importance of judicial indepen-
dence for purposes of human rights.
[T]his Court has said that one of the principal purposes of the sepa-
ration of public powers is to guarantee the independence of judges.
Such autonomous exercise must be guaranteed by the State both in
its institutional aspect, that is, regarding the Judiciary as a system, as
well as in connection with its individual aspect, that is to say, con-
cerning the person of the specific judge. The purpose of such protec-
tion lies in preventing the Judicial System in general and its members
73. Id.
74. JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAl LAw 95 (Cambridge 2005).
75. Id. at 205.
76. Id. at 7.
77. Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107, 171 (July 2, 2004).
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in particular, from finding themselves subjected to possible undue
limitations in the exercise of their functions, by bodies alien to the
Judiciary or even by those judges with review or appellate
functions.78
Likewise,
[T]he right to be tried by an impartial judge or tribunal is a funda-
mental guarantee of due process. That is, it shall be guaranteed that
the judge or the tribunal exercise maximum objectivity in the trial.
In this respect, this Tribunal has established that impartiality requires
that the judge in a private conflict is closer to the facts of the cause
with no subjective prejudice and, similarly, offers sufficient guaran-
tees from the objective standpoint so that it is beyond all doubt that
there is full impartiality. The impartiality of the tribunal means that
its members should not have any vested interest, a premeditated de-
cision, preference for any of the parties involved, and that they are
not involved in the dispute. Personal or subjective impartiality is as-
sumed unless there is evidence to the contrary. In turn, the so-called
objective evidence consists of determining whether the questioned
judge can provide convincing elements to eradicate any legitimate
fears or well-grounded suspicions of partiality regarding his person.79
Thus, the robustness of a judicial system is not solely an internal mat-
ter; it has consequences beyond the borders of its own country. Some of
those consequences might have individual impact as in the case of the
enforcement of a judgment in a foreign country or in the case of compen-
sation or restitution in international tribunals, but in all cases the lack of
judicial independence damages the country internally and externally as a
trustworthy place with which to interact.
IV. FACTORS TO MEASURE
The independence of the judiciary is an issue that has caught the atten-
tion of the United Nations. It has expressly stressed that "[t]he indepen-
dence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in
the Constitution or the law of the country. It is the duty of all govern-
mental and other institutions to respect and observe the independence of
the judiciary."80
Most democratic countries in the world provide for independence of
78. Barbera v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 182, T 55 (Aug. 5, 2008).
79. Ramirez v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 207, 1 117 (Nov. 20, 2009).
80. UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, 7th UN Congress on
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Milan, Italy, 08/26-09/06/
1985, G.A. Res. 40/32 (Nov. 29, 1985) and G.A. Res. 40/146 (Dec. 13, 1985), U.N.
40th Sess., Supp. no. 53, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985) [hereinafter Basic Principles on
the Independence of the Judiciary].
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their judiciaries in their laws.81 But the independence analysis of a judi-
cial system of a country should focus more on the practice and less on the
theory as expressed in the laws. Of course, that is not to say that the
reference to judicial independence in the laws of a given country should
be ignored. On the contrary, the starting point of the assessment should
be the legal provisions. Not only in terms of their reference to judicial
independence, but also in terms of the organization and structure of the
courts.
As mentioned above, the first test to undertake is to analyze whether
the country has a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial
administration of justice. As per those terms, to objectively measure the
independence of the judiciary, several factors need to be considered.82
A. APPOINTMENT OF THE JUDGES
In a system of judicial independence, judges are appointed according to
their merits, academic credentials, seniority, and other conditions estab-
lished by the local laws.
According to the United Nations principles,
[P]ersons selected for judicial office shall be individuals of integrity
and ability with appropriate training or qualifications in law. Any
method of judicial selection shall safeguard against judicial appoint-
ments for improper motives. In the selection of judges, there shall be
no discrimination against a person on the grounds of race, colour,
sex, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or status, except that a requirement, that a candidate
for judicial office must be a national of the country concerned, shall
not be considered discriminatory.83
In addition,
[T]he term of office of judges, their independence, security, adequate
remuneration, conditions of service, pensions and the age of retire-
ment shall be adequately secured by law. Judges, whether appointed
or elected, shall have guaranteed tenure until a mandatory retire-
ment age or the expiry of their term of office, where such exists.
Promotion of judges, wherever such a system exists, should be based
on objective factors, in particular ability, integrity and experience.84
Thus, when judges are appointed for reasons other than their profes-
sional merits or academic credentials and given an unstable term of of-
fice, their independence is compromised.85 For example, when judges are
81. Joseph B. Diescho, The Paradigm of an Independent Judiciary: It's History, Impli-
cations, and Limitations in Africa, in TIIE INDEPENDENCE OF ImIE JUDICIARY IN
NAMIBIA, 17, 18, 22, 23, 25 (Nico Horn & Anton Bos1 eds., 2008).
82. See Osorio v. Dole Food Co., No. 07-22693-Civ-HUCK, 2009 WL 3400321 (S.D.
Fla. Aug. 13, 2009) (Garcia-Bolfvar Exp. Rep. & Aff. 23) [hereinafter Garcia-
Boliver Exp. Rep. & Aff.].
83. Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, supra note 80, 10.
84. Id. J 11-13.
85. See Garcia-Bolivar Exp. Rep. & Aff. 91 233(a)-(b).
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appointed based on political affiliation or economic interest, as when they
represent a quota of an economic sector, their independence is at stake in
detriment to society at large.86
Additionally, the promotion of judges to higher judicial positions
should be based on objective criteria such as ability, integrity, and
experience.87
B. DECISION MAKING
Judges should make their decisions based solely on the facts proved
and the applicable law. When a government official instructs a judge on a
ruling, the independence of the judiciary is sacrificed.88 When a judge is
unable to make a decision according to his or her own analysis of the
facts and the law because he or she could be removed, the independence
of the judicial office is lost.89 When a judge makes a decision based on
the amount of money involved, the benefit she or someone else will re-
ceive, the judiciary becomes an outlet of merchandise to be sold. In that
sense, the United Nations principles point out that "[t]he judiciary shall
decide matters before them . . . on the basis of facts and in accordance
with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements,
pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or
for any reason."' 0
Likewise,
[T]here shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference
with the judicial process, nor shall judicial decisions by the courts be
subject to revision. This principle is without prejudice to judicial re-
view or to mitigation or commutation by competent authorities of
sentences imposed by the judiciary, in accordance with the law."
Further, the process of judicial review should be given consideration.
In an independent judicial system, decisions should only be reversed
through the appellate process.92 By the same token, judges should have
immunity for actions taken in their official judicial capacity.' 3 Repercus-
sions for judicial decisions made in compliance with the law undermine
the independence of the judiciary. The United Nations principles pro-
vide: "[wlithout prejudice to any disciplinary procedure or to any right of
appeal or to compensation from the State, in accordance with national
law, judges should enjoy personal immunity from civil suits for monetary




88. Id. TT 99-100.
89. Id. TT 87, 99-100, 233(a)-(b).
90. Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, supra note 80, 9 2.
91. Id. at 1 4.
92. See Garcia-Bolivar Exp. Rep. & Aff. T 76.
93. Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, supra note 80, 1 16.
94. Id.
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Likewise, courts should be assigned by objective criteria, such as by
random methods or based on a judge's areas of expertise, and not at the
discretion of an individual or at the request of judges.
C. DISCIPLINE
The existence of disciplinary mechanisms is considered when assessing
judicial independence. In most countries there is a process for submitting
complaints about a judge and the public is aware both of the process and
body in charge of the discipline of judges.95 These disciplinary bodies are
independent from the judiciary itself.9 6 Likewise, in sophisticated judicial
systems where independence is essential, the rules clearly define ethical
and conflict interest issues.97
According to the United Nations principles,
[A] charge or complaint made against a judge in his/her judicial and
professional capacity shall be processed expeditiously and fairly
under an appropriate procedure. The judge shall have the right to a
fair hearing. The examination of the matter at its initial stage shall
be kept confidential, unless otherwise requested by the judge. . . .
[A]ll disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings shall be deter-
mined in accordance with established standards of judicial conduct.98
D. REMOVAL OF JUDGES
Judges should not be removed from office at the discretion of politi-
cians, but rather for reasons previously provided within the law and only
after the proper procedures have been conducted.99 When judges can be
removed or disciplined at the will of any person, they are ultimately ac-
countable to that person and not to the rule of law. 00
The abovementioned principles expressly state that
[J]udges shall be subject to suspension or removal only for reasons of
incapacity or behaviour that renders them unfit to discharge their
duties .... [D]ecisions in disciplinary, suspension or removal proceed-
ings should be subject to an independent review. This principle may
not apply to the decisions of the highest court and those of the legis-
lature in impeachment or similar proceedings.' 0 '
95. Filing a Judicial Complaint in State Courts: an Overview, NOW LEGAL DEFENSE
AND EDucATION FUND, 1-2 (2002), http://www.legalmomentum.org/assets/pdfs/fil-
ing.pdf.
96. See Garcia-Bolivar Exp. Rep. & Aff. 67, 79, 82.
97. For example, the United Kingdom's Judicial Appointments Committee publishes
the relevant rules. See Conflict of Interest Rules for Selection Decisions, JUDICIAL
APPOINTMENTS COMMISSION, 1, 9 1, http://jac.judiciary.gov.uklabout-jac/145.htm
(U.K.).
98. Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, supra note 80, $1 17, 19.
99. See Garcia-Bolivar Exp. Rep. & Aff. 99 80, 221.
100. See id.
101. Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, supra note 80, 11 18, 20.
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V. METHODOLOGY TO MEASURE THE INDEPENDENCE OF
A JUDICIAL SYSTEM
The assessment of the independence of a judicial system needs to be as
objective as possible. A suggested method to achieve that purpose entails
an analysis of all the factors mentioned above from a comprehensive per-
spective that considers the theory as well and the practice. 102
A. REVIEW OF THE LOCAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A thorough review of a country's legal framework as it pertains to the
judicial system is crucial. 03 This review should not only cover the spe-
cific laws related to the judiciary, but also interconnected laws that might
impact the operations of the courts in optimum conditions.104 This analy-
sis usually starts with the constitution of the country and considers the
specific provisions related to the judicial system and appointment and re-
moval of judges. 05 Of paramount importance is the design and division
of the governmental branches as well as the political structure and
dynamic.
For example, in some countries, their constitutions provide that the ju-
dicial system is independent, but in reality, judges owe their office man-
dates to the political leaders.106 When the legislative branch appoints
judges, one must look deeper to determine how the legislature is elected.
In some countries, members of the legislature are elected in slates that
are in turn chosen by the strongmen of the parties, a circumstance that
diminishes the ultimate independence of the courts. 07
B. CONSULTATION WITH LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS
Lawyers, businessmen, union members, judges, policy makers, non-
governmental organizations, chambers of commerce, universities, media,
and common users of the courts whose opinions can be obtained are im-
portant stakeholders of the judiciary. 08 A 360-degree analysis of the
opinions is generally necessary to confirm that the views of one sector of
the country are also shared by other sectors. 109 For example, one sector
of the country might have a negative opinion of the judicial system be-
cause the judiciary issued a decision that affected its interest. But the
same opinion might not be shared by other sectors of the country; in this
case, it would be necessary to consult additional sectors of the country to
determine a shared view on the factors relevant to the independence of
the judiciary.
102. See Garcia-Bolivar Exp. Rep. & Aff. 23.
103. See id. 37.
104. See id. 39.
105. Id.
106. See id. 1 89, 180, 191.
107. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1348.
108. See Garcia-Bolivar Exp. Rep. & Aff. 1 38, 40, 42.
109. Id. 1 42.
2012] 45
46 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 18
In some cases the opinions of the stakeholders are easily available as
they have been published, but in other cases it would be necessary to
directly consult them through surveys or questionnaires" 0 specifically tai-
lored to consider their views on the issues of interest vis-d-vis the inde-
pendence of the judicial system.'
C. REVIEW OF EMBLEMATIC CASES
By reviewing cases where there is a widespread perception that a judi-
cial decision was not made solely based on the facts and the law, but by
outside influence, it is possible to assess the level of independence of a
judiciary.
In Osorio v. Dole Food Co.,11 2 for example, reference was made to the
Esso case. Accordingly, in 2007, based on a complaint filed by the Nica-
raguan Customs Authority alleging that American oil company .Esso
Standard Oil was late in paying its customs duties, a Nicaraguan Judge
ordered seizure of all the company's facilities.113 The judicial measure
was taken without requesting that the Customs Authority post a bond, as
required by law, and without affording Esso other due process guaran-
tees, such as service of process."14
Reportedly the court appointed a government officer to act as a tem-
porary administrator of Esso's assets on behalf of the Customs Au-
thority. The government officer leased some of Esso's tanks to the
Nicaraguan State owned Petroleum Company, which needed them to
store petroleum. Subsequently, the facilities were returned to Esso,
but remained subject to the government-imposed lease with the Nic-
araguan State owned Petroleum Company. Under political pressure
Esso settled with the Government of Nicaragua and allowed it to use
its facilities but outrage for violation of basic principles of rule of law
was widely expressed." 5
Then U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua, Paul Trivelli, said "that action
was unjustified, amounted to confiscation and was of great concern." 116
He also urged the Nicaraguan government respect the rule of law." 7
Cases like this, plus an analysis of the previously discussed factors and
use of the suggested methodology, can lead to the conclusion that a judi-
cial system lacks independence. 1' 8
110. See Garcia-Bolivar Exp. Rep. & Aff. T 38, 40-42.
111. For the USAID reports, the author was part of a team that conducted both tai-
lored questionnaire and direct interviews with stakeholders.
112. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1307.
113. Garcia-Bolivar Exp. Rep. & Aff. 111.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.; see also Eduardo Marenco & Esteban Solis, EEUU Amenaza, EL NUEVO
DIARIO (Aug. 21, 2007).
117. Garcia-Bolivar Exp. Rep. & Aff. 111.
118. Id. 91 232-33.
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D. VALIDATION THROUGH SECONDARY SOURCES
An important tool in determining the independence of a judicial sys-
tem is validation by the opinions of others. The purpose of the validation
is to confirm the findings yielded by the analysis while considering the
opinions of others who differ on the conclusion. The goal is to find incon-
sistencies in the conclusions or consider aspects that were not previously
analyzed.
Unfortunately, in the world of indicators and indexes there are none
related to judicial independence. But, there are some indicators and re-
ports that can be helpful to validate the analysis of the independence of a
judicial system in order to produce an objective opinion.
The following is a list of secondary sources that can be used to validate
conclusions on the independence of a judiciary. As the independence of
a judicial system needs to be measured in a timeframe, consideration
should be given to the year in which these reports and indexes are
produced.
1. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices.119 These reports are produced every year pursuant to federal
law and prepared by the U.S. government. They are meticulously con-
structed after extensive investigation aimed at producing objective and
accurate findings.
For example, the 2007 report on Ecuador said:
While the constitution provides for an independent judiciary, in prac-
tice the judiciary was at times susceptible to outside pressure and
corruption. The media reported extensively on the susceptibility of
the judiciary to bribes for favorable decisions and resolution of legal
cases and on judges parceling out cases to outside lawyers who wrote
judicial sentences on cases before the court and sent them back to
the presiding judge for signature. 120
2. The U.S. Department of State Commercial Guides.121 The U.S.
Department of State issues a guide annually on how to do business in
every country with which the United States maintains diplomatic rela-
tions. It is intended to provide assistance to U.S. companies when doing
business in those countries. The report is re-published online by the U.S.
embassies.
In the 2001 Guide on Panama, the report said:
Panama is a representative democracy with three branches of gov-
ernment: executive and legislative branches elected by direct vote
every five years, and a nominally independent judiciary appointed by
the executive. Because the current Panamanian judicial system is
119. 2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/index.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2012).
120. 2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Ecuador, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE
(Mar. 6, 2007), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78890.htm.
121. Country Commercial Guides, U.S. Dar'r OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/
rpts/ccg/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2012).
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inefficient at best, and corrupt at worst, many U.S. companies doing
business in Panama have arbitration agreements in place as an alter-
native to the courts.122
3. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (U.S.T.R.), National Trade
Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers.123 The U.S.T.R. is the main
representative of the U.S. government for foreign trade matters.124 Its
office issues annual reports describing barriers to U.S. business abroad.
It deals with the issue of rule of law as it relates to the flow of trade.125
In its 2009 report on Nicaragua, it said: "U.S. companies have raised
concerns that Nicaragua's legal system is weak, cumbersome, and subject
to political influence and that many members of the judiciary, including
those at high levels, are believed to be corrupt." 26
4. Other reports produced by the U.S. government can be useful,
such as the U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism,127
which under federal law requires the Secretary of State to provide to
Congress each year a full and complete report on terrorism with regard to
those countries and groups meeting criteria set forth in the legislation.
5. Similarly the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,128 which under federal law re-
quires the Secretary of State to provide to Congress each year a full and
complete country-by-country report concerning international drug trade,
chemical control, money laundering and financial crimes.129
6. USAID is an agency of the U.S. government that provides eco-
nomic development and humanitarian assistance around the world in sup-
port of the foreign policy goals of the United States.130 Occasionally it
produces reports on countries in which it operates. In 2005, it issued the
Trade and Commercial Law Assessment-El Salvador.131
The state of El Salvador's judicial system is no less than dire: the
system suffers from untenable delays, inadequate training of both
professional and administrative staff, a lack of judicial independence,
122. 2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Panama, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE
(Mar. 11, 2008), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100648.htm.
123. U.S.T.R. Trade Barriers Report, http://www.ustr.gov.
124. Mission of the USTR, OFFICE OF TIE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://
www.ustr.gov/about-us/mission (last visited Dec. 28, 2011).
125. Reports and Publications, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://
www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/reports-and-publications (last visited Dec. 28,
2011).
126. 2009 Nat'l Trade Estimate, supra note 123, at 357.
127. Country Reports on Terrorism, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/
crt/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2011).
128. Bureau of International Narcotics & Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. DEPi'T OF
STATE, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2011).
129. Narcotics Control Reports, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/
nrcrpt/index.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2011).
130. About USAID, USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/about-usaid/ (last visited Dec. 28,
2011).
131. Trade & Commercial Law Assessment - El Salvador: Final Report, BIZCLIR.com
(Jan. 2005), http://www.bizclir.com/galleries/country-assessments/EI%20Salvador.
pdf.
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and otherwise unqualified personnel who hold important positions,
including judges. There is an absence of public confidence in the
system that is charged with supporting meaning implementation of a
commercial law structure. 132
Some indexes and indicators relate indirectly to judicial independence.
1. Governance Research Indicator Country Snapshot, World Bank.133
The World Bank is a multilateral organization with the goal of reducing
poverty and advancing economic development.134 It produces indicators
on governance. 135 One of its governance indicators assesses the rule of
law in a particular country. 136 The rule of law category includes several
indicators that assess the extent to which people "have confidence in and
abide by the rules of society."' 37 These include perceptions of the inci-
dence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and
the enforceability of contracts.138 For example, in 2010, Bolivia scored
13.3 in rule of law, with 100 being the highest possible score.139
2. World Bank Corporate and Public Ethics Indices. 140 The World
Bank produces indices on corporate and public ethics for more than 102
countries. 141 Its index on judicial and legal effectiveness deals with judi-
cial independence, judicial bribery, the quality of a country's legal frame-
work, property protection, parliament effectiveness, and police
effectiveness. 14 2 In 2007, Pakistan scored 4.8 in the index on judicial and
legal effectiveness, with 100 being the highest possible score.143
3. Transparency International, Global Corruption Report-Corrup-
tion in Judicial Systems. 1 4 4 Based in Germany, this organization is con-
132. Id. at 1-7.
133. Governance, WORLo BANK, http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/topic/governance (last
visited Dec. 28, 2011).
134. About Us, WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EX-
TABOUTUS/,,pagePK:50004410-piPK:36602-theSitePK:29708,00.htmI (last vis-
ited Dec. 28, 2011).
135. Worldwide Governance Indicators, WORLD BANK, http://info.worldbank.org/gov-
ernance/wgi/index.asp (last visited Dec. 28, 2011).
136. See Key Variables, WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTER-
NAL/WBL/WBIPROGRAMS/KFDLP/EXTUNIKAM/0,,contentMDK:20588132-
menuPK:1453369-pagePK:64168445-piPK:64168309-theSitePK:1414721,00.html
(last visited Dec. 28, 2011).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. World Governance Indicators: Rule of Law, WORLD BANK, http://info.worldbank.
org/governance/wgi/index.asp (last visited Jan. 11, 2012); the full dataset can be
downloaded at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/wgidataset.xls.
140. Corporate Corruption/Ethics Indices: Country Averages (2004), WORLD BANK,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGOVANDANTICORRUPTION/Re-




144. Global Corruption Report 2007 Corruption in Judicial Systems, TRANSPARENCY
INT'L, http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/gcr_2007 (last visited Dec. 28,
2011).
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sidered the paramount international watchdog on corruption.14 5 It issues
annual reports on the status of corruption in almost all countries of the
world.146 It also counts with the Global Corruption Barometer, a survey
that "assesses general public attitudes toward, and experience of, corrup-
tion in dozens of countries around the world."1 47 Likewise, it provides
countries with National Integrity System reports which are detailed re-
ports on the status of corruption in the countries comprising the judicial
system.148
The Transparency International 2007 Global Corruption Report on ju-
dicial systems stated that there is a
[P]erception . . . [that] . . . the judiciary . . . [is] . . . corrupt and
politicized in most Central American countries, with the exception of
Costa Rica . . . . [I]n Nicaragua, the disappearance of a large sum of
money from a Supreme Court bank account resulted in a public out-
cry . . . .[T]here are certainly Supreme Courts that have done just as
badly (Nicaragua, Honduras) using their powers to install their pro-
t6g6s and control their further actions.149
4. Heritage Foundation, Index of Economic Freedom. 50 This U.S.-
based foundation produces an annual report that measures and ranks 184
countries across ten specific freedoms including freedom from corrup-
tion.151 In 2011, Nicaragua scored twenty-five in freedom from corrup-
tion with 100 being the highest possible score.'5 2
Corruption is perceived as pervasive. Nicaragua ranks 130th out of
180 countries in Transparency International's Corruption Percep-
tions Index for 2009. Influence peddling in the judicial branch puts
foreign investors at a sharp disadvantage in any litigation. Corrup-
tion and political deal-making, especially within the ruling Sandinista
party, the National Police, and the judiciary, are viewed as pervasive.
In January 2009, the Supreme Court freed former President Arnoldo
Alemin from house arrest and vacated corruption charges against
him.153
5. Global Integrity, Country Report. 154 This U.S.-based organization
145. About Transparency International, TRANSPARENCY INT' L, http://www.trans-
parency.org/about-us (last visited Dec. 28, 2011).
146. See Transparency International's Annual Reports, TRANSPARENCY LNT'L, http://
www.transparency.org/publications/annual-report (last visited Dec. 28, 2011).
147. Global Corruption Barometer, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, http://www.transparency.
org/policy-research/surveys-indices/gcb (last visited Dec. 28, 2011).
148. NIS Reports by Country, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, http://www.transparency.org/pol-
icyresearch/nis/nis reports by-country (last visited Dec. 28, 2011).
149. Global Corruption Report, supra note 144.
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(last visited Dec. 28, 2011).
152. Index of Economic Freedom, supra note 150.
153. Nicaragua Information on Economic Freedom, HERITAGE FOUND., http://
www.heritage.org/index/country/Nicaragua (last visited Dec. 28, 2011).
154. Global Integrity Report 2010, GLOBAL INTEGRITY, http://www.globalintegrity.org/
information/downloads (last visited Dec. 28, 2011).
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provides independent information on governance and corruption in dif-
ferent countries.155 In 2010, Guatemala scored forty-six in Judicial Inde-
pendence, Fairness, and Citizen Access to Justice with 100 being the
highest possible score.156
6. Freedom House, Country Report. 157 This world freedom watch-
dog organization issues annual country reports on different topics related
to freedom, such as rule of law. In 2011, its report on Colombia said:
"The justice system remains compromised by corruption and extortion.
The Constitutional Court and Supreme Court have, on multiple occa-
sions, demonstrated independence from the executive. Lower courts are
more susceptible to political and criminal influence, and both judges and
prosecutors confront serious risks when investigating powerful
figures." 58
7. Bertelsmann transformation index.159 This is a global ranking re-
port produced by the Germany-based Bertelesmann organization that
analyzes and evaluates development and transformation processes in 119
countries while providing a comprehensive view of the status of democ-
racy, market economy, and the quality of political management. 160 In
2011, its report on Honduras said: "The separation of powers is estab-
lished in the constitution. Yet in practice, the judiciary is not fully inde-
pendent. Clientelistic networks of political and economic groups still
dominate the judicial system, so that the judiciary cannot be seen as an
autonomous and effective counterweight to the other powers."1 61
8. Business Anti-Corruption Portal.162 Co-funded by the Danish In-
ternational Development Agency (Danida), this portal has the purpose of
supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in avoiding and
fighting corruption and in creating a better business environment by pro-
viding relevant information for businesses to fulfill their missions.163 In
the 2011 report on Guatemala, it said:
The judiciary is troubled by corruption, inefficiency, and the intimi-
dation of judges, prosecutors, and witnesses, according to both Free-
155. Our Impact, GLOBAL INTEGRITY, http://www.globalintegrity.org/about/impact (last
visited Dec. 28, 2011).
156. Integrity Indicators: Gauatamala 2010, http://www.globalintegrity.org/report/Gua-
temala/2010/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2012).
157. FREEDOM HousE-, http://www.freedomhouse.org (last visited Dec. 28, 2011).
158. Freedom in the World 2011 - Colombia, FREEDOM House, http://expression.free-
domhouse.org/reports/freedom-in-the world/2011/colombia (last visited Dec. 28,
2011).
159. Transformation: BTI, Bertelsmann Stiftung, BERTELSMANN TRANSFORMATION IN-
DEX, http://bti2006.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/11.0.html?&L=1 (F.R.G.)
(last visited Jan. 11, 2012).
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161. Honduras Country Report, BERTELSMANN TRANSFORMATION INDEX, http://www.
bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/fileadmin/pdf/GutachtenBTI201O/LAC/
Honduras.pdf (F.R.G.) (last visited Jan. 11, 2012).
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dom House 2010 and the US Department of State 2009. The
Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2007
reveals that citizens perceive the judiciary to be among the most cor-
rupt institutions in Guatemala. Almost half of the respondents to
the Latinobar6metro 2008 (see English version) public opinion poll
consider that it is possible to receive a favourable sentence by brib-
ing a judge.164
9. The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index is a quantitative as-
sessment tool designed to offer a "detailed and comprehensive picture of
the extent to which countries adhere to the rule of law in practice," in-
cluding access to justice as provided by independent adjudicators.16 5 In
2011 El Salvador scored less than 0.5 out of 1.0 possible in the sub-factor
"absence of corruption in the judicial branch."166 The report also
stressed, "Civil courts are generally accessible, but slow, and corruption
in the judicial system is a serious cause for concern."1 67
The statements of international organizations per se are not conclusive
on the existence or lack of an independent judiciary. But, when those
statements are consistent among each other and with other analysis and
opinions, the conclusion more often tends to indicate that the judicial sys-
tem lacks a system of impartial tribunals. Of course, each opinion, state-
ment, and indicator requires a specific comparative and perspective
oriented analysis which takes into account the different factors above-
mentioned and the different angles of the issue. For example, the indica-
tor might refer to corruption in the country and not specifically in the
judiciary or the opinion or statement might reflect cases where the inter-
ests of the government are at risk.
By the same token, opinions of the local organizations, governmental
documents, surveys that gather the opinion of the country's residents, and
local media opinions and news are also instrumental in validating conclu-
sions on the independence of judicial systems.
Similarly, the time period under which the assessment is conducted and
the reform initiatives are important pieces in the goal of reaching an ob-
jective analysis. On looking at the evolution of the judicial independence,
the analysis is able to show whether there has been improvement or dete-
rioration over time. For example, if the judicial system is in bad condition
as it relates to independence but serious and thorough reform plans are
under way, the conclusion could differ between one period and another.
164. Guatemala Country Profile, Bus. ANTI-CORRUTION PORTAL, http://www.busi-
ness-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/latin-america-the-caribbean/guatemala/
corruption-levels/judicial-system/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2011).
165. World Justice Project Rule of Law Index, WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, http://
worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2011).
166. Mark Agrast, Juan Botero, Alejandro Ponce, World Justice Project Rule of Law
Index 2011, WORLD JUSTICE PROJEcr, http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/
files/wjproli20110.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2012).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Judicial independence is not only a key element of a sound democracy,
but also a key element of a sound economy. In a world where the econo-
mies are no longer an internal issue, the lack of judicial independence is a
matter of potential transnational litigious consequences.
This article highlights some situations where the lack of judicial inde-
pendence can not only affect the effectiveness of a judgment beyond the
territory of a country, but also make the state responsible internationally.
There could be other situations where the lack of judicial independence
could have a foreign impact. Likewise, the consequences can exceed
those pointed out herein. For one, the lack of judicial independence at a
minimum is bad publicity for countries. The consequences of a tainted
image vis-d-vis international credit in the broad sense of the term are
obvious. Countries eager to attract capital and have access to interna-
tional financing tools are likely to be negatively affected by a consistent
perception that the judiciary is not independent. Of course, foreign in-
vestors can find ways around weak judicial systems to solve their poten-
tial disputes. But, those paths require design of corporate, contractual,
and even treaty structures, for which professional advice and advocacy is
needed, all of which increase the costs of the business.
On the other hand the citizens of the country affected by the malaise of
the lack of judicial independence have no way out. That in itself is a
cause of concern for the damage it causes internally to those who might
not have any recourse to obtain justice, as the democracy could be mal-
functioning. It is also potentially a cause of international instability as the
pressure put on a political system that cannot deliver justice can eventu-
ally turn into social unrest and potential violence that undermines the
political structure of a country and compromises the peace and the geo-
political equilibrium with its neighbors. Migration, border conflicts, and
international intervention can be the ultimate consequences of this state
of affairs. Thus, although lack of judicial independence is not a determi-
nant of social unrest and political turmoil, the bottom line is that weak
judiciaries are not good for anyone.
In today's world, countries compete against each other for capital,
credit, resources, and even brain power. In that continuum, it is becom-
ing increasingly more common that countries are measured, compared,
and ranked in different areas such as business climate, 168 corruption,169
and competitiveness. 170 Unfortunately, there are no indicators specifi-
168. The World Bank issues the doing business indicators annually. See About Doing
Business: Measuring for Impact, DOING BUSINESS, http://www.doingbusiness.org/-/
media/FPDKM/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB12-
Chapters/About-Doing-Business.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2012).
169. Transparency International issues global corruption indexes annually. See Trans-
parency International, http://www.transparency.org (last visited Dec. 28, 2011).
170. World Economic Forum issues the world competitiveness indexes annually. See
Reports, WORLD ECONOMic FORUM, http://www.weforum.org/reports (last visited
Dec. 28, 2011).
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cally devoted to measure objectively, uniformly, and consistently the judi-
cial independence of a country. But some methodology can be used to
approach the issue from a holistic perspective.
The result of an assessment can be used for tangible matters of transna-
tional litigation and international dispute resolution such as the ones de-
scribed in this article. Such an assessment can be used by either party for
purposes of proving the judicial independence or the lack thereof. It can
be used by the parties in conflict or by the adjudicator, either a judge or
an arbitrator. But more importantly, it can be used by countries-both
policy makers and social innovators-to obtain a diagnostic of the judici-
ary and from there design reforms, advocate for changes and eventually
undertake an ultimate program of transformations. That is a challenging
task, but one that should be the object of another essay.
